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ROLLING STONE
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SECRET AGENT MAN

NO WONDER MILES COPELAND'S KIDS FORMED THE POLICE

DOUBLE AGENTS SELLING SECRETS TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS; defectors running amok in the streets of Washington; allies betraying allies — these days spies are out of the shadows and on the spot. Yet espionage isn't what it once was, and at least one Cold War vet fondly remembers overthrowing unfriendly governments, planning assassinations and performing dirty tricks. Most of all, retired CIA officer Miles Copeland (whose brood of rock & roll overachievers includes oldest son Miles Copeland III, manager of the Police and solo Sting; Ian, founder of the music booking agency FBI; and youngest son Stewart, drummer first for Curved Air and later for the Police) yearns for the good old days when secret agents kept their secrets secret — from the government and especially from the press.

Born in Birmingham, Alabama, Copeland joined the U.S. Army in 1940. Assigned to the Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC), he transferred in 1942 to the new Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the first U.S. secret intelligence agency. After the war, Copeland was

BY ROBERT ERINGER

station chief in Damascus, "putting Syria," as he recalls, "on the path to democracy by starting a military dictatorship." For this achievement, he was awarded a presidential citation. Copeland became a member of the Central Intelligence Agency when it was founded in 1947; he was appointed chief of the agency's Political Action Staff, the dirty-tricks department, in 1951. "Nobody," he says, "knows more about changing governments, by force or otherwise, than me."

Copeland left government service in 1957 to form his own "private CIA," which he claims became the largest private security service operating in Africa and the Middle East. Today the seventy-two-year-old Copeland and his wife, Lorraine, a well-known British archaeologist, live in a stone cottage in the tranquil hamlet of Aston Rowant, near Oxford, in England.

The White House has given the CIA part of the job of handling terrorism. What do you think they will do that is different from what has already been done?

You know, you're opening a real can of worms here. The difference between the CIA's counterterrorism experts and this new kind that's been proliferating all over the place is that the CIA has operators who know the terrorists, who've actually talked to a few, who've even lived with them, or who, like myself, have actually been terrorists. We understand the enemy, while these instant experts who've been advising the White House have never in their lives laid eyes on a terrorist, and they think of them as common criminals. Maybe they are, and maybe they aren't, but where these recent "experts" are wrong is that they assume they are criminals simply because they are judging them as though they are Americans, brought up on American ideas of what's right and what's wrong. They are making moral

judgments that aren't relevant to the situation. What may be effective in combating crime is not likely to be effective in dealing with wrongdoers who in their own eyes, whether rightly or wrongly, think they are engaged in some noble cause. The Pentagon wants to kill them; the CIA wants to win them over.

Who's winning?

It's not a matter of winning. Just different viewpoints. The president of the United States has got to say what is necessary to keep himself in office. We have a domestic foreign policy and a foreign foreign policy. The domestic foreign policy, which is the more important one, is what he has to do to make the American public think he's doing the right thing. Whether it's the right thing or not doesn't matter. The American people have to think he's doing the right thing because we have a democratic society. Now, the American people were highly indignant about what happened in Beirut (the hijacking of TWA flight 847 in June 1985). They wanted to do something. They wanted to punish the people without regard to the consequences. The president had to say things to them, make threats, to show the American people that, by God, we were doing something. But the professionals inside the government were worried about the consequences of this. Because what it takes to please the American people is not what it takes to please a lot of people who did not grow up in the American culture but grew up in cultures quite different from our own. We've got most of the world against us at the moment. When we drag out our gunboats, bomb villages and kill a lot of women and children — a lot more than the terrorists kill — we turn the world against us. And the American people don't care. They don't give a damn. But those people whose job it is to look after the interests of the U.S. government abroad, they've got to care. They have to think of the consequences of everything we do. And they know the consequences of dragging out the gunboats are absolutely the wrong ones. In fact, these are the consequences the terrorists created acts of terrorism in order to provoke. That's the purpose of terrorism, not to kill, maim or destroy, but to terrify, to frighten, to anger, to provoke irrational responses. Terrorism gains more from the responses than it gains from the actions themselves.

So how do you deal with it?

You've got to know who they are. You've got to know their reasons for doing it. And you've got to manipulate them in one way or another. We have to somehow come to grips with the problem. The Israelis went in to Lebanon and killed tens of thousands of people. They say, "That's exaggerating, we didn't kill but 5000 people." Okay, let's say they killed only 2000 people, which is a very modest estimate. But they destroyed Lebanon. They then set up groups against each other, made chaos ten times worse than it already was. Instead of helping the Shites — the Shites welcomed the Israelis in — we, the United States, gave a billion dollars

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EXECUTIVE CHANGES

• **Scott Science and Technology Inc.**, Lancaster, Calif., has named to its board William E. Colby and Robert F. Werner, both general partners of Colby, Bailey, Werner & Associates, and Ronald B. Frankum, president of Telecom Futures Inc.

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CHIEF OF *Spies*

When President Carter nominated Admiral Stansfield Turner to direct the Central Intelligence Agency in 1977, the Washington experts thought they had the career officer figured out. Sure, they conceded, he was bright, sophisticated, polished. And yes, they went on to agree, he certainly *looked* the part.

But was he tough enough? Some questioned whether he possessed the qualities to tame an agency that had been under fire in the press and investigated by Congress for illegal activities. Rather than run the "rogue elephant," as the agency had come to be known, it would run him, critics feared. He was, they contended, too nice. "[He] is not Billy Mitchell," the *New Republic* lamented. "For his many strengths, he remains very much a man of the system."

The *New Republic* needn't have worried. Army Brigadier General Billy Mitchell always had been one of Turner's heroes. Like Mitchell—who was court-martialed in 1925 for championing the cause of air power in heretical ways—Turner also relished dissenting from conventional military viewpoints.

Moreover, as part of the team assembled by Admiral Elmo (Bud) Zumwalt Jr., Chief of Naval Operations from 1970 through 1974, he helped the contentious Zumwalt modernize an aging, tradition-bound—and often resistant—Navy. Along the way, Zumwalt dubbed Turner his "resident S.O.B.," his devil's advocate.

As CIA director, Turner remained in character. Rather than function as just another figurehead, a trap into which some directors reportedly had fallen, Turner did what few people expected: He turned out to be the maverick.

For example, he reasserted the director's authority over the so-called "old boy" network that long had dominated the agency. Consisting of the top men of the CIA's three major operational branches—espionage, analysis and technical development and operation—that network functioned very nearly as a closed and independent fiefdom, apparently resisting all outside interference. Including, incidentally, that of the CIA director himself.

All of that changed under Turner. During the ensuing four years, he reinstated, on a limited basis, "covert"-type intelligence operations (an activity that had fallen into disuse), took steps to open up the agency to greater Congressional oversight, increased the role of technology in spying, and, in one abrupt and fiercely criticized stroke, slashed 820 job slots from the agency's espionage branch.

Such moves embittered a sizable portion of the intelligence work force. One ex-CIA man, John K. Greaney, likens Turner to a "Captain Queeg type" who was suspicious of the more experienced agency employees and ignored their advice. "He thought they were out to torpedo his ship," says Greaney, now executive director of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO), a group of 3,200 ex-intelligence personnel. "The trouble with Turner," he adds, "is that he was an outsider who just didn't understand the workings of the intelligence community."

Nonsense, retorts Turner. Precisely because he was an outsider, he maintains, he often was better able to perceive the need for change in intelligence operations than entrenched agency veterans. "The 'old

boys' tried to create a mystique around the idea of intelligence," he says, "and give the impression that only they could understand it. But it isn't that hard for an outsider to grasp."

By this time, you would think, the unseemly tussle between Admiral Turner and the old boys of the CIA would be ancient history. Not so. Five years after leaving "the company," as the CIA is amiably known in Washington, Turner remains embattled. Not as a top government official, but this time as a writer, lecturer and, most particularly, as a critic of America's current intelligence and military policies.

At 62, an age when most retired admirals are easing into lives of comfortable obscurity, Turner once again is departing from the usual pattern.

Still the outsider, and still the quintessential maverick, he very nearly is turning iconoclasm into a third career. For example, early in 1985 he published his first book, *Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition* (304 pages, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, \$16.95). The book reflects Turner's worry that the agency he believes he helped reform and modernize in the late 1970s is backsliding—returning to the controversial ways that got it into trouble with Congress.

Gadfly though he may be, he is also, as the *New Republic* was at least partly right to suggest, a man of the system. If he were not, Turner probably would not be found sitting, along with many other retired admirals and generals, on the boards of giant corporations. Turner, for example, is a member of the board of directors of such firms as the Monsanto Chemical Company, the

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